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Faculty and Deans

Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of
Shareholders and Other Stakeholders?

The SEC's Suspension and
Bar Powers in Perspective
Jayne W. Barnard"
Enron has brought about demands ffom many quarters to grant the Secunties and
E¥change Commission (SEC) newpowers. Among thepowers the SECnow seeks is thepower
to bar or suspend securities law violators fiom serving as an officer or director ofany public
company. ClJITently, the law assigns this power only to federal district courts. In this Essay,
Professor Barnard traces the history ofthe cUITent Jaw, examining Hily Congress has expressly
withheld suspension and bar powers ffom the SEC. She then argues that the courts have
exercised their suspension and barpowers wisely, and that recent developments do not compel
any legislative change. Finally, recognizing that Congress may weD be persuaded that new
legislation is necessary, she provides model statutory language that could be used for such a
change.
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Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
Director of the Division of Enforcement, Stephen M. Cutler, suggested
that the Commission would soon be seeking legislative authority to bar
those offenders found liable for securities laws violations from serving
* James Goold Cutler Professor of Law, The College ofWilliam & Mary School of
Law, Williamsburg, Vrrginia. Thanks to Doug Branson for creating the opportunity for me to
express my views on this unfolding topic, to Jeremy Eglen and Craig Grider, who spent part
of their spring break tracking down references for inclusion in the Essay and to the student
editors of the Tulane Law Review for outstanding editorial work under significant time
constraints.
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as an officer or director of any public company. 1 Cutler argued that the
existing statutory scheme, which limits the authority to impose such a
bar to federal judges in litigated proceedings, is inadequate.2 He
further suggested that the case law currently governing bar orders has
imposed an ''unreasonably high" standard of proof on the
Commission.3
I would like to suggest that the standard of proof for barring an
offender from serving as an officer or director is high for several
reasons, having to do with concerns that the SEC rarely considers.
These concerns have to do with the right of citizens, even convicted
felons, to seek work commensurate with their skills; the right of those
who are found to have violated the law, even the securities laws, to be
subject to punishment proportionate to their wrongdoing; the right of
defendants in civil cases not to be subject to "punishmenf' at all; and
the right of shareholders under applicable state law to defme the
composition of the board that will represent their interests.
Congress had these rights in mind when it enacted the existing
statutory scheme governing bar orders.4 Congress had these rights in
mind when it expressly declined to extend to the Commission the
authority to enter such orders unilaterally. Congress anticipated
correctly, in hindsight, that the Commission would overrely on the bar
order rather than crafting more carefully tailored orders and would
often seek to bar defendants for whom alternative remedies would be
more appropriate. Thus, we should not be surprised that Congress
reserved for the courts the power to enter bar orders and set a high
threshold, "substantial unfitness;' for entering such orders.
The federal courts have understood Congress's intentions in this
area. In considering the SEC's requests for bar orders over the last
decade, some federal courts have said "no" to the Commission's
overreaching requests. These courts have recognized that many federal
securities law offenders are unlikely to recidivate and that outside of a
1.
Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks at the Glasser LegaJWorks 20th Annual Federal
Securities Institute, atwww.sec.gov/news/speechlspch538.htm (Feb. 15, 2002).
Id
ld
4.
The scheme may be found at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2000), which provides:
In any proceeding under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the court may prohibit,
conditionally or unconditionaUy, and permanently or for such period of time as it
shaii determine, any person who violated section 78j(b) of this title or the rules or
regulations thereunder from acting as an officer or director of any [public
company] if the person's conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve as an
officer or director ofany such issuer.
2.
3.
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criminogenic milieu, many offenders can make significant
contributions to legitimate businesses. In some cases, therefore, these
courts have declined to enter any form of bar order, and in other cases
they have imposed a more limited order (in terms of duration or scope)
than that sought by the SEC. A thoughtful reading of these decisions
reveals that they are based on a well-developed evidentiary record and
a careful application of the relevant factors.
Nevertheless, the SEC now argues that the courts have employed
"a burdensome and overly restrictive test''5 in securities cases. As a
result, the Connnission would now like to "improve" the existing
statutory regime. It would like to seize from the courts the power to
enter its own occupational bar orders against securities law offenders.
It happily sees in the Enron debacle an opportunity to achieve this
goal.
This Essay argues that Congress should resist the SEC's efforts to
6
expand its powers in this area. It goes on to suggest that, if Congress
cannot resist the SEC's blandishments, then Congress should be
careful to specify the circumstances under which (and the procedures
by which) a suspension or bar order may legitimately be entered by the
SEC.

I.

THE CURRENT STATUTORY REGIME

The origins of the existing statutory scheme can be traced to the
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the
Treadway Commission), which in 1987 recommended that "the SEC
should seek explicit statutory authority to bar or suspend corporate
officers and directors involved in fraudulent fmancial reporting from
future service in that capacity in a public company."7
The SEC embraced this recommendation, and in 1989, the
Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989 (1989 bill) was

5.
Cutler, supranote 1.
6.
As this Essay is written, the Commission is also promoting a number of other
enhancements to its authority, which are not addressed here. These enhancements include
elimination of the scienter requirement under rule 1Ob-5, the development of a powerful new
corporate governance "self-regulatory organization" that would be overseen by the
Commission, increased penalties, new definitions of insider trading, and possible revisions to
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See Jacob M. Schlesinger, O'Neill
U~ighs Stricter Corporate Penalties, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2002, at A3.
7.
Jayne W. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989:
Disenfi:anchising Shareholders in Order to Protect Them, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 32, 32
(1989) (quoting Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 66
(1987)).
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introduced.8 Among other provisions, the 1989 bill provided that the
SEC could, in administrative proceedings under section 15(c)(4) of the
Exchange Act, enter an order against "any person found to have failed
to comply, or to have been a cause of the failure to comply'' with the
reporting requirements of the Act, barring or suspending them from
serving as an officer or director of any public company.9 In addition,
the 1989 bill sought express statutory authority to seek such orders in
litigated proceedings.
At the time, few critics challenged the notion that the SEC could
seek a court-ordered removal of a corporate officer or director, or a
corporation-specific suspension or bar, even without express statutory
authority. Indeed, the SEC had often sought such court orders and
embodied such orders in litigation settlements. 10 Moreover, in a few
compelling cases, the SEC had sought more aggressive court orders,
including orders that would either temporarily or permanently
disqualify an offender from serving as an officer or director of any
public company. These draconian orders (known as "comprehensive
suspensions or bar orders") had also been embodied in litigation
settlements. 11 Thus, there was little objection to memorializing these
practices in legislation. Critics did argue, however, that
permitting the SEC, as opposed to the federal district courts, to compel
removal or disqualification of corporate officers and directors-either in
a corporation-specific context or with a comprehensive order-would
grant the Commission unwarranted power and would distort its proper
role in maintaining the integrity of the capital markets. 12
Criticisms focused on the SEC's "adjudicatory competence, potential
for abuse of discretion and the question of whether the suspension and
bar power [would permit] the SEC to 'punish' individuals (which is
constitutionally impermissible for a regulatory agency) or merely to
regulate their conduct."13
These criticisms were embraced by the Business Law Section of
the American Bar Association, which vigorously opposed the 1989
bill. As a result of the section's efforts, the bill was significantly
amended. "The amended bill narrowed the suspension and bar
provisions by deleting the SEC's authority to impose executive
8.

9.
10.
11.

12.
13.

Id at33.
Id at 34 (quoting H.R. 975, IOlst Cong. (1989)).
Seeid
Seeid
Id
Id at 35-36 (footnote omitted).
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suspension or bar orders on its own and by limiting the bill's
application in litigated matters to instances of 'scienter-based fraud."' 14
Thus, when the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act (Remedies Act) fmally became law in 1990,
Congress had unequivocally rejected the initial scheme by which the
SEC, as well as the federal courts, would have enjoyed suspension and
bar authority. As it is now, the SEC has limited cease-and-desist
authority's while the federal courts can employ a hierarchy of remedies
that deal with both short-term and long-term remedial goals.
In the first instance, courts can enter a number of types of
injunctions, each requiring a distinctive and exacting standard of proof.
The simplest form of injunctive relief is the disgorgement order, in
which the defendant is required to disgorge her profits, sometimes
accompanied by a civil penalty. 16 Next in complexity is the
misconduct-specific injunction, in which the defendant is ordered not
to repeat the type of behavior that is the subject of the current
proceeding.'' Next comes the more generalized, yet still topic-specific
injunction, in which the defendant is ordered not to engage in any form
of misconduct similar to that involved in the current proceeding. 18
Finally, and most ambitiously, comes the omnibus "obey-the-law"
injunction, in which the defendant is prohibited from violating any
portion of the federal securities laws, on pain of contempt and
additional sanctions.' 9
14. Jayne W. Barnard, Men Is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to
Serve"?, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1489, 1494 (1992).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (2000).
16. See, e.g., SEC v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding $9.2
million disgorgement order plus a civil penalty of $500,000); SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd.,
41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 529-30 (D.N.J. 1999) (ordering disgorgement of$2, 106,185 but declining
to order payment of a civil penalty); SEC v. Farrell, No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367, at
*11 (W,D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1996) (ordering disgorgement of $32,187.50 and payment of a civil
penalty in an equivalent amount).
17. See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(affirming an injunction against further violations ofsection 13(d)).
18. See, e.g., SEC v. Poirier, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1047 (D. Ariz. 2001) (enjoining
the defendant from future violations of sections 17(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933,
sections 7(t) and lO(b) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of1934, rule lOb-S promulgated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and regulation X); SEC v. Dimensional Entm't Corp.,
518 F. Supp. 773, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (enjoining the defendant from violating sections 5(a),
S(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and rules 1O(b)-5 and 1O(b)-6 thereunder).
19. See, e.g., SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505,530 (D.N.J. 1999)
(entering an obey-the-law injunction); SEC v. Antar, 15 F. Supp. 2d 477, 533 (D.N.J. 1998)
(entering on obey-the-law injunction against all defendants); SEC v. Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d
508, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (entering an obey-the-law injunction against defendant Falbo).
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All of these injunctions except the disgorgement injunction
depend on the government's ability to demonstrate that, in the absence
of an injunction, there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations.20
This requirement has been stringently applied to the SEC's (and other
agencies') requests for injunctions.21 Some of the Commission's
frustration in this area may derive from the fact that, even aside from
its ability to seek suspension and bar orders, its efforts to secure broad
injunctive reliefhave sometimes been rebuffed for lack of evidence.22
And it is important to note that misconduct-specific injunctions,
more generalized injunctions, and "obey-the-law'' injunctions were
already available to the SEC when the Remedies Act was passed. One
could reasonably conclude, therefore, that the suspension and bar
authority embodied in the Act was created to provide new tools where
the existing tools had proven inadequate.23 Stated another way, one
could reasonably conclude that suspension and bar orders were
intended for use only where the court was convinced that the other
forms of injunctions would likely be insufficient. This would mean
that the standard for imposing a suspension or bar order would
necessarily be different-and higher-than the standard for imposing
a garden-variety injunction. Specifically, suspension and bar orders
would be entered only in cases of recidivism or truly egregious
misconduct. This is the position that was taken by the SEC in
20. SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 943 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Commonwealth
Chern. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90,99-100 (2d Cir. 1978).
21. See Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REv. 427,453-54, 456-58
(2001) (tracing the history of SEC injunctions generally, and the history of the "likelihood of
future violations" requirement specifically).
22. See, e.g., SEC v. Pros Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 767,769 (lOth Cir. 1993) (upholding
denial of injunction where there was ''no evidence that future violations are likely"); SEC v.
Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (denying the SEC's request for an
injunction because future violations were unlikely as actions were isolated, conduct was not
egregious, and participants regretted their involvement); SEC v. Enters. Solutions, Inc., 142 F.
Supp. 2d 561, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to enter an injunction against one of the
defendants where the Commission failed to demonstrate that he was likely to commit further
violations); SEC v. Globus Group, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (refusing
to enter injunction where SEC action was based on "isolated, as opposed to recurrent,
violations of the securities laws"); Falbo, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (enjoining one defendant but
declining to enjoin the other where the Commission failed to demonstrate as to the second
that it was reasonably likely that he would commit future violations). One commentator has
opined that courts in recent years have become increasingly stringent in their requirements for
injunctions in SEC cases. See David Franklin Levy, Comment, The Impact ofthe Remedies
Act on the SECsAbility to Obtain Injunctive Relief, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 645, 655-71 (1994).
23. "The Senate report [accompanying the Remedies Act] indicates that the purpose
of Pub. L. No. 101-429 was to 'provide the agency with a broader range of remedies to
protect investors and maintain the integrity of the nation's security markets."' United States v.
Merriam, 108 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting S. REP. No. 101-337 (1990)).
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24

describing how it intended to use its new remedial tool. It is also the
position most federal courts have taken in applying the Remedies Act.

II.

THE COURTS' APPROACH TO THE STATUTE AS WRITTEN

Courts are empowered to enter a suspension or bar order when
the government is able to demonstrate the defendant's "substantial
unfitness to serve." There was little useful legislative history to this
important phrase. Courts, however, have consistently employed a sixpart test in determining whether such an order is appropriate.
The test derives from a law review article published in 1992.25
The first court to construe the statute adapted the proposal contained in
that article and considered the following six factors in deciding
whether to make a "substantial unfitness" fmding: "(1) the
'egregiousness' of the underlying securities law violation; (2) the
defendant's 'repeat offender' status; (3) the defendant's 'role' or
position when he engaged in the fraud; (4) the defendant's degree of
scienter; (5) the defendant's economic stake in the violation; and
(6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur."26
The most significant and thoughtful articulation of the six-part
test emerged two years later from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in SEC v. Patel21 While the court recognized
the six-part test as ''useful in making the unfitness assessment;' it went
on to caution that
[w]e do not mean to say that [the six factors] are the only factors that
may be taken into account or even that it is necessary to apply all these
factors in every case. A district court should be afforded substantial
24. See Barnard, supra note 14, at 1510 ("In lobbying for the Remedies Act, both
SEC Chairman Richard Breeden and his predecessor, David Ruder, assured Congress that the
Commission would seek executive suspension and bar orders only in cases of 'egregious'
misconduct or of repeated violations of the securities laws!').
25. Id
26. SEC v. Shah, No. 92CIV1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993).
This formulation is very similar to the test employed by the SEC when deciding whether to
suspend or bar a broker or other fmancial professional in administrative proceedings before
the Commission. When the Commission determines administrative sanctions, it considers
the egregiousness of the defendant's actions, the isolated or recurrent nature of the
infraction, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity of the defendant's
assurances against future violations, the defendant's recognition of the wrongful
nature of his conduct, and the likelihood that the defendant's occupation will
present opportunities for future violations.
In re Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, Inc., Initial Decision, Release No. ID-180, 2001 WL
66344, at *21 (Jan. 29, 2001) (quoting Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir.
1979), aff(J, 450 u.s. 91 (1981 )).
27. 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995).
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discretion in deciding whether to impose a bar to employment in a
.
28
publ1c company.

The six-part test for determining whether to enter a suspension or
bar order has now been embraced by every court to have considered
the matter. The test is similar to the test employed to deteiilline
whether other forms of injunctive relief should be ordered in securities
cases, especially in its emphasis on the government's need to prove the
likelihood of future misconduct.29 As the court in Patel correctly
observed, the likelihood of future misconduct is "always an important
element in deciding whether [to order] a lifetime ban."30 And, as it has
done in cases involving other types of injunctive relief,31 the Second
Circuit was careful to note that, in the absence of a record of
recidivism or defiance of previous injunctive orders against the
defendant, the district court must "articulate the factual basis for a
finding of the likelihood of recurrence."32 This is often a hard case to
make, as the science of predicting white-collar recidivism is inexact, at
3
bese Nonetheless, the Commission has consistently been successful
in making that case, as the decisions in the following Part attest.

A.

The Commissions Success!iJJApplication ofthe Statute to
Deserving Defendants

Since its passage in 1990, the Remedies Act suspension and bar
provision has been invoked successfully on many occasions. An early
decision in the Second Circuit, for example, affmned comprehensive
bar orders against the legendary scoffiaw Victor Posner and his son,
upholding the district court's fmding that the defendants had
"committed securities law violations with a 'high degree of scienter'
and that their past securities law violations and lack of assurances
against future violations demonstrated that such violations were likely
to continue."34 fu SEC v, First Pacific Banco1p, the United States
28. Id at 141.
29. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
30. 61 E3d at 141.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 52 E3d 1173, 1184 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting the
distinction between cases involving "systematic wrongdoing'' and those involving an
"isolated occurrence" in determining whether an injunction against future labor racketeering
would be appropriate).
32. 61 E3d at 142.
33. See Barnard, supra note 14, at 1517-19 nn.152-161 (summarizing the socialscience literature regarding white-collar recidivism).
34. SEC v. Posner, 16 E3d 520, 521-22 (2d Cir. 1994). Based on its review of the
Posners' "long and notorious history of engaging in self-dealing and corporate waste to the
detriment of the public shareholders of companies under their control," the district court
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly a:ffmned a
comprehensive bar order where the defendant Sands, the chairman of
the board, CEO, and corporate counsel of a bank holding company,
had orchestrated a complex scheme that had brought down a federally
insured bank with a loss of $688,000 to investors.35
These two cases represent· the two most compelling scenarios for
the imposition of a comprehensive bar order, the recidivist (Posner)
and the big-time defrauder (Sands). They each are excellent templates.
A more recent case, SEC v. Farrell,36 shows yet another successful
use of the suspension and bar statute. In Farrell, the defendant had
engaged in insider trading activities while serving on the board of a
37
publicly owned bank. The defendant was prosecuted criminally and
incarcerated. ~ The Commission then sought both an injunction
prohibiting further violations of Rule 1Ob-5 and also a comprehensive
bar order.39 The former was granted; the latter denied, at least in part.
The court, recognizing the flexibility embodied in the statute, stated:
Based upon the record, a permanent officer or director bar is not
appropriate. Farrell's securities violations were serious and he did
engage in fraudulent conduct in the hopes that his illegal activities
would not be discovered. However, upon release from prison, he should
not be barred from holding any other officer or director positions.
Farrell is a talented executive and a permanent bar would effectively
prevent him from using those talents to rebuild his life. However, in
3

Jtiew ofFarrens offense~ he is permanenCy barred ffom holding an
officer/directorposition with any banking or financial institutions.40

concluded that "one would be hard-pressed to fmd more worthy candidates to be barred from
serving as officers and directors." SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587,
603, 614-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
35. 142 F.3d 1186, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 1998). The lower court in this case found that
the defendant had
caused the collapse of a federally insured bank; he attempted to stymie banking
regulators from doing their jobs; he is a recidivist; and the fraudulent conduct he
committed occurred while serving in a corporate or fiduciary capacity. The district
court also found that Sands had a high level of scienter, that he engaged in ongoing
and recurrent violations, that he had failed to assume any responsibility for his
violations of law, that he utterly failed to recognize the wrongful nature of his
conduct, and that there was a strong likelihood of future violations.
Id at 1193-94 (quotations omitted).
36. No. 95-CV-6133T, 1996 WL 788367 (w.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1996).
37. Id at *1-*3.
38. /dat *4.
39. Id
40. Id at *8 (citation omitted and second emphasis added).
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This decision illustrates that, even within the suspension and bar
provision, there is a hierarchy of options available to the courts. One
might describe the range of options as follows, with the least invasive
type of injunction listed at the bottom of the chart and the most
invasive type listed at the top. The result in the Farrell case is
highlighted, indicating that the order in that case was a significant and
meaningful one.

A permanent comprehensive bar order
A limited-term comprehensive suspension order
A permanent functional bar A permanent industry-wide bar order
order (e.g., the offender may {e.g., the offender may not serve as an
officer or director of any public company
not serve as the chief
financial officer of any
in the fmancial services industry)
public company)
A limited-term functional
A limited-term industry-wide suspension
suspension order
order
A permanent corporation-specific bar order
A limited-term corporation-specific suspension order
Another successful case, resulting in the entry of an order at an
even higher level of invasiveness than Farrell is SEC v. McCaskey. 41 In
that case, the defendant was engaged in market manipulation. He
ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud and was
sentenced to five years probation, a $30,000 fme, and a $100,000
special assessmene2 In the SEC civil enforcement action that
followed, the Commission sought a disgorgement order, civil monetary
penalties, and both an injunction against future statutory violations and
a comprehensive bar order.43 In its opinion, the district court found that
the issues of disgorgement and monetary penalties were not ripe for
decision on a motion for summary judgment, but entered an irljunction
against future violations of the securities laws.44 Reviewing the
defendant's behavior and current circumstances, the court also
concluded that McCaskey was substantially unfit to serve as an officer

41.
42.
43.
44.

No. 98CIV6153, 2001 WL 1029053 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2001).
Id at*l.
Id at *5-*7.
Id
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45

or director. It therefore suspended him from serving as an officer or
director of any public company for a period of six years.46
Two additional cases may be cited in which, unlike in Farrell and
McCaskey, the SEC got everything it asked for. In SEC v. Soflpoin~
Inc., the Commission sought a permanent bar order against the chief
operating officer of a publicly held company who had orchestrated a
series of securities laws violations including earnings manipulation,
the sale of unregistered stock, and the filing of numerous misleading
10-Ks, 10-Qs, and registration statements.47 Even though the
defendant was a frrst-time offender, the court had no difficulty
entering an injunction permanently enjoining him from future
violations of the securities laws and also permanently barring him
from serving as an officer or director of a public company.48
In SEC v. Zublds, the Commission sought a permanent bar order
against an executive who had presided over a ''boiler room" operation,
through which dozens of investors purchased worthless, unregistered
49
securities. Noting that "Mr. Zubkis violated several federal securities
laws and did so with scienter [and that he] did not commit an isolated
infraction, but instead committed numerous violations over the course
of several years;'50 the court here, too, found no difficulty in entering a
permanent bar order.51
In addition to these reported cases, the SEC has been successful
52
in a number of unreported cases and has repeatedly been able to settle
45. Id at *7.
46. Id
47. 958 E Supp. 846, 851, 866-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff(f, 159 E3d 1348 (2d Cir.
1998).
48. Id at 866-67. The defendant was also ordered to disgorge $474,416 plus
prejudgment interest of$61,155; in addition, he was assessed a $100,000 civil penalty. Id at
867-68; see also SEC v. Chester Holdings, Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 2d 505, 531 (D.N.J. 1999)
(entering a comprehensive bar order).
49. No. 97CIV8086, 2000 WL218393, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2000).
50. ld at *10.
51. The court found:
Over a period ofseveral years, Mr. Zubkis, as head ofZ3, knowingly orchestrated a
securities fraud that netted several million dollars and from which he stood to
profit personally. The misrepresentations in this case were egregious. This is,
moreover, not the first time that Mr. Zubkis has been found in violation of
securities-related rules.
ld at *11.
52. See, e.g., SEC v. Hollywood Trenz, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Act Release No. 17204, 76 SEC Docket 335 (Oct. 25, 2001) (reporting disposition of a civil
enforcement action in which the United States District Court for the District ofColumbia had
entered a permanent bar order against the defendant); In re Silver, Exchange Act Release No.
34-38914, 65 SEC Docket 372 (Aug. 11, 1997) (reporting that, in a prior civil action, the
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many of its litigated cases with consent decrees in which suspension or
bar orders played a prominent role. 53 This success in the settled cases
may be due to the SEC's talent for driving a hard bargain.54 It is at least
as likely that these cases were settled, and suspension or bar orders
were consented to, because the defendants were deserving of those
sanctions and the reported cases suggested to their lawyers that if they
resisted the terms presented, the bar would have been imposed by a
court. Either way, in assessing the utility of the current statutory
scheme, it is as important to look at the settled cases as the decided
ones, virtually all of which have been favorable to the SEC.

B.

The Defendants J:vho ""GotAway'

The SEC's Mr. Cutler suggests that the successful prosecutions
described in the foregoing Part are the exceptions. He complains that,
"when it comes to 0 and D bars, the courts have simply lost their
way."55 He points to the Farrell and McCaskey cases as examples of
United States District Court for the Central District of California had entered a permanent bar
order against the defendant).
53. See, e.g., SEC v. Barber, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No.
17314,2002 WL 54148, at *1 (Jan. 15, 2002) (permanently barring former CFO from acting
as an officer or director of any public company); SEC v. Caserta, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Act Release No. 17115, 75 SEC Docket 1772 (Sept. 5, 2001) (permanently
barring a former CEO and CFO); SEC v. Itex Corp., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Act Release No. 16841, 73 SEC Docket 3194 (Dec. 26, 2000) (permanently barring former
CEO who agreed to disgorge $1.4 million); SEC v. Itex Corp., Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Act Release No. 16708, 73 SEC Docket 859 (Sept. 18, 2000) (permanently
barring defendant Neal who agreed to disgorge $2,300,000 and pay a $200,000 civil penalty);
SEC v. Mitchellette, SEC Release No. 16553, 72 SEC Docket 1102 (May 15, 2000)
(permanently barring the company's founder); SEC v. Buchanan, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Act Release No. 16518, 72 SEC Docket 596 (Apr. 18, 2000) (permanently
barring the defendant); SEC v. Strauss, SEC Release No. 16360,71 SEC Docket 216 (Nov.
17, 1999) (permanently barring the defendant); SEC v. United Fire Technology, Inc., SEC
Release No. 16271, 70 SEC Docket 1191 (Sept. 2, 1999) (permanently barring defendant
Kamerling who agreed to disgorge $1,066,515); SEC v. Drabinsky, SEC Release No. 16022,
1999 WL 10253, at *1 (Jan. 13, 1999) (permanently barring the defendant Eckstein); SEC v.
DiMauro, SEC Release No. 16017, 1999 WL 3456, at *1 (Jan. 7, 1999) (suspending the
defendant DiLorenzo for ten years); SEC v. DiMauro, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Act Release No. 15874, 67 SEC Docket 2171 (Sept. 9, 1998) (permanently barring the
defendant Di Mauro); SEC v. Safronchik, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release
No. 15833, 67 SEC Docket 1651 (Aug. 5, 1998) (permanently barring the defendant); SEC v.
Peltz, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 15657, 66 SEC Docket 1343
(Mar. 3, 1998) (permanently barring the defendant); SEC v. Kilgore, SEC Release No. 15345,
64 SEC Docket 1107 (Apr. 23, 1997) (permanently barring the defendant).
54. See Mitchell E. Herr, Does the SECDemandMore in Settlement Than It Can Get
at Trial?, Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (CCH) 607 (Apr. 23, 2001) (noting a "pervasive pattern in which
the SEC seeks harsher sanctions in settlement than it is likely to get at trial'').
55. Cutler, supranote 1.
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the courts' unwarranted generosity in this area. ·He also cites the
56
decision in the Patel case, which, upon close reading, hardly seems to
be shocking. But even if one believes Patel was incorrectly decided,
one arguably questionable decision does not represent a system that is
broken and needs fiXing.
Patel, like the Farrell case, involved insider trading by the
defendane7 Not only had the defendant engaged in securities fraud, he
had done so with knowledge that the company's stock price had been
artificially inflated based on false documentation he had submitted to
the Food and Drug Administration.58 At the end of the day, he pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to defraud the FDA, though he was not prosecuted
criminally for the insider trading.59 He had, however, settled a
securities fraud class action claim with a payment (in stock) valued at
$3 million.lo In the civil enforcement proceeding brought against him
by the SEC, Patel "conceded that he had violated the antifraud
provisions and agreed that a permanent injunction against future
violations would be appropriate.',6 1 However, he resisted imposition of
a bar on his service as an officer or director of any public company.62
63
The district court ruled against him.
On appeal, the court reviewed with some care the fmdings below
under the six-part test:
Applying the factors suggested by Professor Barnard, the district
court found: that Patel's violations were not egregious in comparison
with those of others and in view of the size of the loss avoided; that
Patel was a first-time offender; that in his position as officer and
director of Par, Patel allowed the false Application to be submitted and
obstructed the FDA investigation of the Application by providing a
"switched sample" ofMaxzide to an FDA inspector; that Patel "showed
some scienter in his actions, although he did not engage in clandestine
trading"; that he was the sole economic beneficiary of his insider
trading; and that, because he was a founder of Par and abused his
position as officer and director, "the likelihood of future misconduct is
64
sufficient to warrant the imposition of the injunctive relief requested."

56.
57.
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.

SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995).
Jd at 138.
Jd
Jd at 139.
Jd
Jd
Jd
Jd
Jd at 141.
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The court then focused on the record regarding the defendant's
likelihood of future misconduct:
The only findings that the district court made in this regard were that
"Patel was a founder of Par and used his position as an officer and
director to engage in misconduct." This is merely a general statement
of events and can in no way justify the prediction that future
65
misconduct will occur.

Finally, the court took note of the hierarchical nature of the
suspension and bar provision and the possibility that some form of
suspension order short of a lifetime bar might be appropriate:
[T]he governing statute provides that a bar on service as an officer or
director that is based on substantial unfitness may be imposed
"conditionally or unconditionally'' and "permanently or for such period
of time as [the court] shall determine." We take these provisions to
suggest that, before imposing a permanent bar, the court should
consider whether a conditional bar (e.g., a bar limited to a particular
industry) and/or a bar limited in time (e.g., a bar of five years) might be
sufficient, especially where there is no prior history of unfitness .... If
the district court decides that a conditional ban or a ban limited in time
is not warranted, it should give reasons why a lifetime injunction is
.
d.66
nnpose
67

The case was then remanded. The defendant's lawyer reports
that the case was settled soon thereafter, with the defendant agreeing to
pay less than originally ordered, in exchange for the imposition of a
lifetime bar.68
Only one other published opinion could possibly support the
Commission's desire for a change in the suspension and bar statute.
That case, SEC v. Shah, is the only published opinion in which a
federal court has denied in its entirety the Commission's request for a
suspension or bar order.69 (It was also the very first case in which the
"substantial unfitness" language was construed by a court.)
Shah involved the former president of a generic drug company
who was involved in a scheme to bribe FDA examiners in order to get
the company's products approved for distribution.70 During the period
when the company was paying the "illegal gratuities," the defendant
65.
66.
67.
68.
author).
69.
70.

Id
Id at 142 (alteration in original).
Id
E-mail from Michael J. Resko to Jayne W. Bernard, Apr. 4, 2002 (on file with
No.92CIV1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993).

Id
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was selling his stock.71 After the story broke, the defendant was
prosecuted criminally for paying the gratuities but not for insider
trading. 72 He pled guilty. He settled a private civil action for $35,000,
agreed to testify against two of his codefendants, and then was sued by
the SEC in an enforcement action in which the Commission sought a
comprehensive bar.73
After ordering a disgorgement of $119,053 (plus prejudgment
interest), the court declined to enter the requested bar order.74 The
court noted that "the loss ... avoided through [the defendant's] illegal
sales . . . is relatively small. Thus, his violation of the securities laws
should not be considered 'egregious."'75 In addition, the court found
that Shah was a first-time offender, that his degree of scienter was "not
... very high;' and that the "likelihood of future misconduct appears
relatively slight."76 On the basis of these fmdings-and especially in
light of the collateral penalties already imposed on the defendant-the
court denied the SEC's request for a bar order.77 The SEC did not
appeal the Shah decision.
Thus, it would seem that the SEC's dissatisfaction with the state
of the law governing suspensions and bars rests largely on the decision
in SEC v. Shah, which it declined to appeal, and the thoughtful
approach to the statute evidenced by the court of appeals in United
States v. Patel, a case which the Commission ultimately won.
In every other reported decision, and in unreported ones as well,
the SEC has been successful in its efforts to secure meaningful
remedies. It is thus difficult to see anything in this record justifying
the Commission's current anxiety over the Remedies Act.
ill. THE REAL MOTIVATION BEHIND THE REFORM lNITIATivE: ''EASY
STREET"

One might suggest that it is Enron opportunism, rather than a
principled disagreement with Congress or the courts, that is driving the
Commission's current legislative agenda. It is understandable,
however, that the Commission would prefer to have unilateral power to
suspend or bar offenders, rather than waiting for (and in some respects
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id
Id at *2.
Id
/dat *7.
Id (citations omitted).
Id
Id
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paying for) the federal courts to do so. Certainly, it would be more
efficient to assign this power to an administrative process than to a
judicial process.
In addition, federal courts over the last decade have repeatedly
legitimated bar orders entered by administrative agencies. In response
to claims that such orders represent "punishment,'' for example, with
implications under the Double Jeopardy Clause, courts have
consistently held that occupational bars are not "punitive" but merely
"remedial" in nature.78 Courts have rejected claims that administrative
agencies ought not to impose a lifelong bar unless they can show that it
is the least restrictive means of protecting the public.79 Courts have
limited the due process rights of persons facing a summary debarment
order from an administrative agency.so
In other words, the federal courts have seldom rejected or
reversed bar orders entered by administrative agencies. There are
several other very practical reasons, though, why the SEC is eager to
add suspension and bar powers to its existing cease-and-desist powers.
In a nutshell, those reasons are (1) a lower standard of proof than
required in court proceedings; (2) simplified procedures; (3) less
onerous evidentiary requirements; (4) no requirement to show a
reasonable likelihood of future misconduct; and (5) a sense of greater
influence and control over the process. The recent Commission
decisions involving KPMG Peat Marwick LLP illustrate the appeal of
unilateral action as compared to the more burdensome process of
seeking injunctive reliee 1
78. Se~ e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 117 (1997) (holding that an
administrative debarment of banking officials does not constitute punishment); Cox v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 138 F.3d 268, 272-74 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that an
administrative sanction barring a commodities trader from trading in the commodities
markets for life does not constitute punishment); United States v. Merriam, 108 F.3d 1162,
1165 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a disciplinary sanction barring a brokerage f'rrm employee
from associating with any NASD member for life does not constitute punishment); United
States v. Hatfield, 108 F.3d 67, 69 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that a twenty-six-month debarment
of a federal contractor does not constitute punishment); United States v. Boijesson, 92 F.3d
954, 956 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that indef'mite debarment from participating in HUDsponsored programs does not constitute punishment). At least one critic has challenged cases
such as these, arguing that the permanent deprivation of one's livelihood is surely punitive.
See Susan R Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM:. L. REv. 679
(1999).
79. Rizek v. SEC, 215 F.3d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 2000).
80. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) (holding that a banking officer charged
with a felony involving dishonesty may be suspended from his position summarily, and may
not be entitled to a ''prompt" postsuspension hearing).
81. In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43862, 74 SEC
Docket 357 (Jan. 19, 2001) (holding that negligence, rather than scienter, will suftice to
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WHAT AN SEC ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION AND BAR
PROVISION OUGHT TO INCLUDE

While it certainly seems unnecessary to change the current
statutory scheme, and perhaps unwise in view of the Commission's
obvious desire to employ the suspension and bar sanction far more
broadly than would be permitted in the federal courts, it is fair to
consider just what an administrative suspension and bar provision
might include. We can begin with analogies.
A number of federal statutes currently provide for "debarment''
of one type or another.82 Some of these statutes, like the current
Remedies Act provision, require a judicial determination that
debarment is appropriate,83 while others permit the determination to be
made unilaterally by the federal agency involved. Some of the
debarment provisions are categorical and therefore predictable, such as
those that prohibit a person convicted of certain felonies from doing
84
business with the federal government. Other provisions require an
exercise of discretion. Of the latter group, some provisions are quite
detailed in setting out the issues to be considered prior to entering a
support a cease-and-desist order; that the showing required for a cease-and-desist order is
"significantly less than that required for an injunction;" that only "some risk'' of a future
violation is necessary to support a cease-and-desist order; and that ordinarily the existence of
a past violation will suffice to satisfY the "some risk" test); In re KPMG Peat Marwick LLP,
Exchange Act Release No. 44050, 2001 WL 223378, at *6 (Mar. 8, 2001) (reiterating that the
risk of future violations sufficient to support a cease-and-desist order is "significantly less
than that required for an injunction"); see also Morrissey, supra note 21, at 467-70
(comparing the ease with which the SEC may pursue a cease-and-desist order, with the effort
involved in seeking an injunction).
82. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(l) (2000) (permitting debarment of a banking
official where she has "engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound [banking] practice"
from which ''the insured depository institution's depositors have been or could be prejudiced"
and which "demonstrates willful or continuing disregard by such party for the safety or
soundness [of the banking system]"); 21 U.S.C. § 335a(b) (2000) (permitting debarment ofa
person convicted of certain crimes where she has "demonstrated a pattern of conduct
sufticient to fmd that there is reason to believe that [she] may violate requirements under this
chapter relating to drug products").
83. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § SOa-35 (2000) (authorizing district courts to suspend or bar
an ofticer, director, or member of any advisory board of an investment company where the
court finds that he has engaged in a practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving
personal misconduct); 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994) (authorizing district courts to remove a
pension plan official where the court fmds that he has breached any of the responsibilities,
obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by [ERISA]).
84. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8902a(b)(I) (2000) (foreclosing health care providers
"convicted . . . of a criminal offense relating to fraud, corruption, breach of fiduciary
responsibility, or other fmancial misconduct in connection with the delivery of a health care
service" from participation in the Medicare program); 21 U.S.C. § 335a(a) (foreclosing
individuals convicted of an FDA-related felony from seeking approval for a generic drug
product).
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suspension or bar order,ss while others are more amorphous. 86 Some of
the bar provisions set a statutory limit on the number of years for
which an offender can be taken out of circulation,87 and others provide
quite a detailed procedure for terminating the debarment or lifting the
bar.ss
What all this means, simply, is that (1) Congress knew what it
was doing when it assigned the decision-making role to the federal
district courts rather than the Commission and required a fmding of
"substantial unfitness;' and (2) Congress has a number of models to
choose from should it choose to indulge the Commission's request for
a change in the current statute.
Some of the statutes would make poor models for reform,
though, insofar as they give virtually unbounded discretion to the
agency empowered to enter a suspension and bar order unilaterally.~Q
At least three statutes, however, would seem to provide useful models
for drafting an SEC suspension and bar statute. The first is the statute
governing debarment of investment company executives.90 The second
85. See, e.g., 5 U.S. C. § 8902a(f) (requiring a decision on whether to bar a health care
provider to "take into account--(1) the nature of any claims involved and the circumstances
under which they were presented; (2) the degree of culpability, history of prior offenses or
improper conduct of the provider involved; and (3) such other matters as justice may
require").
86. See, e.g., 15 U.S. C. § 80a-35 (permitting debarment of a person who has engaged
or was about to engage in any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving
personal misconduct, and such injunctive or other relief "as may be reasonable and
appropriate in the circumstances, having due regard to the protection of investors and to the
effectuation of the policies declared in section 80(a)-l(b) of this title").
87. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1994) (establishing that the conviction for robbery,
bribery, extortion, embezzlement, grand larceny, burglary, arson, violation of narcotics laws,
or violent crimes bars the offender from serving as an officer, director, trustee, member of
any executive board, business manager, or representative of any labor organization for at least
three but no more than thirteen years); Id § 1111 (establishing that the conviction for
enumerated crimes bars the offender from serving as an administrator, fiduciary, officer,
trustee, custodian, counsel, agent, employee, or representative of any employee benefit plan
for at least three but no more than thirteen years); 33 U.S.C. § 569f(1994) (establishing that
the conviction for intentionally afiiXing a label bearing a ''Made in America" inscription to a
product that is not made in the United States and is used in a civil works project requires
debarment for at least three but no more than five years).
88. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.§ 8902a(g)(4) (permitting a barred health care provider to apply
for reinstatement after the passage of three years, if he can provide "reasonable assurances
that the types of action which formed the basis for the original debarment have not recurred
and will not recur'').
89. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(g)(l) (2000) (permitting federal bank regulatory
agencies to remove summarily bank officials charged with certain crimes "if continued
service or participation by such party may pose a threat to the interests of the depository
institution's depositors or may threaten to impair public confidence in the depository
institution").
90. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9 (2000).
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is the statute governing debarment of investment advisers.91 The third
is the statute governing debarment of brokers and dealers.92 All three
of these statutes contain specific and detailed language governing the
circumstances under which a suspension or bar may be ordered by the
SEC and accordingly require specific factual fmdings to be made.93
The investment company provision also lays out a procedure by which
a person subject to a bar order may seek an exemption if that order
would be "unduly or disproportionately severe or [if] the conduct of
such person has been such as not to make it against the public interest
or protection of investors to grant such application."94
Drawing on these examples, a reasonable provision for the SEC
might look something like this:
(a) The Commission may, after notice and opportunity for
hearing, by order prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, either
permanently or for such period of time as it in its discretion shall
91. Jd § SOb-3.
92. Jd § 78c(b).
93. For example, in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b), an investment company executive may be
debarred where:
( 1) [He or she] has willfully made or caused to be made in any registration
statement, application or report filed with the Commission under this subchapter
any statement which was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or has
omitted to state in any such registration statement, application, or report any
material fact which was required to be stated therein;
(2) [He or she] has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of
1933, or of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or ofsubchapter II of this chapter,
or of this subchapter, or of the Commodity Exchange Act, or of any rule or
regulation under any of such statutes;
(3) [He or she] has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, or procured the violation by any other person of the Securities Act of
1933, or of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or ofsubchapter II ofthis chapter,
or of this subchapter, or of the Commodity Exchange Act, or of any rule or
regulation under any of such statutes;
(4) [He or she] has been found by a foreign lmancial regulatory authority
to have [engaged in similar practices];
(5) [W]ithin ten years [he or she] has been convicted by a foreign court of
competent jurisdiction of a crime, however denominated by the laws of the relevant
foreign government, that is substantially equivalent to an offense set forth in
paragraph (1) ofsubsection (a) ...; or
(6) [B]y reason of any misconduct, [he or she] is temporarily or
permanently enjoined by any foreign court of competent jurisdiction from acting in
any of the capacities, set forth in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) ... , or a
substantially equivalent foreign capacity, or from engaging in or continuing any
conduct or practice in connection with any such activity or in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Jd § 80a-9(b) (citations omitted).
94. Jd § 80a-9(c).
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deem appropriate in the public interest, any person from serving
or acting as an officer or director of any public company, if:
(1) the Commission fmds that, in the absence of such an
order, the person is reasonably likely to continue to violate
the federal securities laws and
(2) the Commission fmds that such person is substantially
unfit to serve in such a position, either permanently or
temporarily.
(b) The fmdings required in section (a) shall be made based on
clear and convincing evidence.
(c) The Commission shall, in considering such an order,
determine that any such order is the least restrictive means of
preventing harm to the public.
(d) The Commission shall by regulation develop a process by
which any such order may be terminated or modified on motion
of the defendant after eight years, where the defendant can
(1) demonstrate that the types of behavior that formed the
basis for the original debarment or suspension have not
recurred and
(2) provide reasonable assurances that such behavior will
not recur.
This proposal is intentionally demanding, in part because the tendency
of regulatory agencies generally to overprosecute95 and in part because
of the special risks that the suspension and bar sanction will be
overutilized96 Thus, it specifically incorporates a "least restrictive
means" provision, which will encourage the Commission to utilize
shorter term suspensions rather than lifetime bars. It also specifically
authorizes a process by which the bar may be lifted after a reasonable
period of time. Without such a process, and a congressional signal that
such a process is necessary, the Commission might well continue its
practice of refusing to lift a bar even when the offender's circumstances
97
and behavior have materially changed.
95. See Clifton Leaf, Enough Is Enough, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 2002, at 60, 68 (noting
that in the ten years from 1992 to 200 I, the SEC referred 609 cases to the Justice Department
for possible criminal prosecution, over sixty-four percent of which the Justice Department
declined to prosecute).
96. See Barnard, supra note 14, at 1520 (noting that "selective incapacitation
schemes, such as that presented by the Remedies Act, inevitably result in courts sanctioning
defendants for whom incapacitation is unnecessary ('false positives') far more often than
they fail to sanction defendants for whom incapacitation is appropriate ('false negatives')").
97. See SEC v. Coldicutt, 258 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) (reflecting the
Commission's resistance to offender's claim that after nine years of compliance with an
injunction it should be vacated because ''the stigma of the injunction cause[d] her
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CONCLUSION

In enacting the Remedies Act, Congress obviously made a
considered determination that, in the case of securities law offenders, a
lifelong bar may be necessary in some cases to protect investors. It
therefore authorized the comprehensive bar as a judicial option.
Congress also, however, set the standard for entering such an order
quite high when it required courts to make a fmding of substantial
unfitness. This decision took into account the many mechanisms by
which corporate officers and directors are selected, monitored,
incentivized, criticized, assessed by the press, evaluated by their peers,
and challenged by the market. It also recognized that, even where
securities laws offenders are not barred by court order from serving,
they will seldom receive offers to serve as public company officers or
directors. And in those few circumstances where an offender is invited
to serve as an officer or director, (1) the details of her crimes will have
to be disclosed to all parties, (2) institutional investors will be watching
her closely, and (3) regulatory agencies like the SEC will have their
eyes peeled and their knives sharpened in the event of future
misconduct.
Congress, in short, believed that suspension and bar orders
should be rare, that they should depend upon clear and convincing
factual evidence of a likelihood of future harm to the public, and that
the federal courts, rather than the SEC, were best suited to make the
necessary fmdings of fact. Congress was right in these assumptions,
and nothing in the twelve years since passage of the Remedies Act
suggests otherwise.
Congress should now resist the efforts of the SEC to amend the
Remedies Act. It should decline to grant the SEC the authority to bar
and suspend offenders from serving as corporate officers and
directors. Instead it should turn its energies to other kinds of reforms
that will strengthen the SEC's hand where it matters.

embarrassment and distress, and that there [was] little likelihood she [would] again become
active as a securities broker or be involved in the securities business'').

